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How Federalism Built the FBI, Sustained Local Police,  
and Left Out the States 
Daniel Richman and Sarah A. Seo1 
 
ABSTRACT. This Article examines the endurance of police localism amid the improbable growth of 
the FBI in the early twentieth century when the prospect of a centralized law enforcement agency 
was anathema to the ideals of American democracy. It argues that doctrinal accounts of federalism 
do not explain these paradoxical developments. By analyzing how the Bureau made itself 
indispensable to local police departments rather than encroaching on their turf, the Article elucidates 
an operational, or collaborative, federalism that not only enlarged the Bureau’s capacity and 
authority but also strengthened local autonomy at the expense of the states. Collaborative federalism 
is crucial for understanding why the police have gone for so long without meaningful state or federal 
oversight, with consequences still confronting the country today. This history highlights how 
structural impediments to institutional accountability have been set over time and also identifies a 
path not taken, but one that can still be pursued, to expand the states’ supervisory role over local 
police. 
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George Floyd’s death at the hands of a police officer in May 2020 may have set off protests 
throughout the country, but a long history of police abuse and violence that continues to this day 
kept the demonstrations going throughout the summer. So too has the inadequacy of mechanisms 
for holding responsible officers and police departments accountable. Federalism is often blamed for 
this failure. Law enforcement has been a local matter since the colonial era and, still today, police 
departments remain largely resistant to federal oversight, especially on matters concerning racial 
justice. For its part, the US Justice Department’s infrequent use of its statutory authority to open 
investigations of police agencies that engage in a “pattern or practice” of constitutional violations or 
to use conditional grants to push police reform reveals a lack of political will to encroach on local 
domains.2  
Yet, federalism doesn’t explain why the states themselves have not supervised the police 
more. While federal control of police officers violates the constitutional system of dual sovereignty 
according to Printz v. United States, states do have the power to regulate the police but, for the most 
part, have chosen not to.3 The limited, too often lacking, responses of governors to police shootings 
make this point all too clear. Moreover, doctrinal accounts of federalism that maintain clear 
boundaries between local and federal spheres do not explain a paradoxical development in American 
law enforcement over the twentieth century: the remarkable growth of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI or Bureau4) amid the persistence of localism. This history is especially puzzling 
given that, during the Bureau’s first fifty years or so, from 1908 to 1960, the national agency and 
local departments devoted a significant portion—in many years a lion’s share—of their caseload to 
investigating one particular crime: auto theft.5 What were the implications of the federal 
government’s sustained involvement in the pursuit of theft, a traditionally local matter?  
This Article argues that formal notions of federalism do not capture the relationship 
between the Bureau and police departments. By examining the actual, on-the-ground workings of 
American law enforcement and focusing specifically on the joint pursuit of auto theft, this Article 
elucidates an operational, or collaborative, federalism that explains how the Bureau became an 
integral part of the criminal justice ecosystem6 while preserving local autonomy and sidelining the 
states in the policing realm.7 This account is crucial for understanding how the police have gone 
without either state or federal oversight for so long, with consequences still confronting the country 
 
2 34 U.S.C. § 12601. 
3 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-922 (1997). 
4 For narrative ease, we use “Bureau” to refer to the agency variously called the “Division of Investigation,” the 
“Bureau of Investigation,” and the “Federal Bureau of Investigation” (from 1934 on). 
5 See Part II.A and tables. 
6 We use “ecosystem” to capture the multiple actors and institutions engaged in policing work, with various 
degrees of interaction. See Sara Mayeux, The Idea of the Criminal Justice System, 45 Am. J. Crim. L. 55 (2018); Bernard 
E. Harcourt, The Systems Fallacy: A Genealogy and Critique of Public Policy and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 47 J. Legal. 
Stud. 419 (2018). 
7 Our historical account provides further support for what Heather Gerken has called the “nationalist school of 
federalism,” which highlights how federalism can actually advance nationalist ends. Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as 
the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 Yale L.J. 1889, 1906 (2014); see also Alison L. LaCroix, The Shadow Powers of 
Article I, 123 Yale L.J. 2044, 2093 (2014) (“Federalism … has always been the United States’ distinctive species of 
nationalism.”). 




today. It helps to explain why racially-inflected police practices, such as civil forfeiture and excessive 
criminal fines and fees, have proliferated without significant scrutiny until only recently.8 By 
highlighting how structural impediments to institutional accountability have been set over time, this 
history can also identify ways of clearing those obstacles, which will better inform our efforts to 
transform law enforcement to be more just and equitable. 
This historical account proceeds in three parts. Part I begins in the first two decades of the 
twentieth century, a period of immense social changes that created new law enforcement 
imperatives. Before then, police obtained information about crimes and criminals by patrolling and 
talking with citizens in their beat.9 But at the turn of the century, especially when mass-produced 
automobiles gave individuals, and criminals, unprecedented mobility, local law enforcement 
increasingly needed information from outside their jurisdictions. This compelled police reformers to 
seek national solutions to crime and persuaded Congress to enact laws criminalizing traditionally 
local crimes that crossed state boundaries. The newly formed but resource-strapped Bureau as well 
as jurisdictionally-constrained police departments needed information-sharing arrangements to bring 
their cases, and Part II examines how this shared necessity facilitated collaborations by focusing on 
the enforcement of the Dyer Act, one of the new federal laws, which criminalized the transportation 
of stolen vehicles across state lines. Part II also examines the National Division of Identification and 
Information, which served as a centralized clearinghouse for crime-related information, to further 
illustrate the Bureau’s collaborative relationship with local police. Finally, Part III explores the 
federalism implications of our story. The working relationship of mutual exchange, or collaborative 
federalism, rendered the federal government largely unwilling to hold the police accountable for how 
they performed their jobs. It also allowed local police departments to retain considerable 
independence from state governments. Ultimately, collaborative federalism, which is missing in 
formal accounts of federalism that subsume local agency into state authority, facilitated the Bureau’s 
growth by privileging its local counterparties. While this Article does not attempt to offer a complete 
account of why police have been largely free from state or federal oversight, it identifies a critical 
historical moment when the result could have been different. By pointing out a road not taken, this 
history suggests that it is not too late to seek that path today. 
I. Towards National Solutions to Crime in an (Auto)Mobile Society 
Profound transformations in American society at the turn of the century necessitated 
national solutions to crime, which had always been handled locally. Part I.A examines the efforts of 
reforming police chiefs, and Part I.B turns to Congress and the creation of the Bureau in 1908. 
Because the country was not yet ready to set aside its ideological opposition to a centralized police 
force, law enforcement adaptations during the years straddling the turn of the century reflected 
 
8 See U.S. Dept. Justice Civil Rights Div. Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department, 2 (2015); Alexandra 
Natapoff, Punishment Without Crime: How Our Massive Misdemeanor System Traps the Innocent and Makes America 
More Unequal (2018); Beth A. Colgan, Fines, fees, and forfeiture, 205, in vol. 4 Reforming criminal justice: A report of 
the Academy for Justice on bridging the gap between scholarship and reform (Eric Luna ed. 2017); Developments, 
Policing and Profit, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1723 (2015).   
9 Christopher Thale, The Informal World of Police Patrol, 33 J. Urban Hist. 183 (2007); Raymond B. Fosdick, 
American Police Systems (1920); Roger Lane, Urban Police and Crime in Nineteenth-Century America, 1, in 15 Crime & 
Justice: Modern Policing (1992). 




Martha Derthick’s observation that Americans have “moved paradoxically both to centralize and 
decentralize.”10  
A. Police Chiefs Seek Federal Assistance 
Since the colonial era, crime control in the United States was a local matter and often 
prosecuted privately.11 Victims—either the individuals themselves or their insurance companies who 
were on the hook for reimbursing stolen goods—investigated and pursued charges against 
perpetrators, who often could not flee very far before the advent of motorized vehicles and better 
roads. Certainly, train travel enabled jurisdiction skipping, but at a frequency and scale that hired 
investigators could manage. 
Beginning in the last decades of the nineteenth century, both aspects of crime control—local 
and private enforcement—were changing. By the 1880s, all of the major US cities had established 
municipal police forces that were slowly but increasingly focusing on crime prevention.12 These 
officers sought to proactively stop criminals before they could commit their misdeeds rather than 
wait for a privately sworn arrest warrant or for a crime to unfold in their presence before taking 
action. Such preventive policing required knowledge not just of illicit plans, but also of potential 
criminals, which, in turn, depended on knowledge of their identities and histories.13  
At the same time, Americans’ increased mobility, aided first by locomotive trains and then 
mass-produced cars, made it difficult for local police departments to keep track of habitual 
offenders. (Auto)mobility also expanded the scope of criminal activities, and towns and cities 
throughout the country were experiencing the limits of local law enforcement.14 Train travel made it 
increasingly possible, for instance, for residents of a dry locale to buy alcohol from a neighboring 
 
10 Martha Derthick, Keeping the Compound Republic: Essays on American Federalism 11 (2001). See also 
Gary Gerstle, Liberty and Coercion: The Paradox of American Government from the Founding to the Present 93 (2015) 
(describing the “improvisational” nature of America’s state-building in response to the “governing challenges of the 
industrial age.”). 
11 J. Edgar Hoover reminisced in 1925 (although not from much personal experience): 
In times past (and not so far distant past) crime or the criminal was a more or less local 
issue. Our local or neighborhood criminal was known, his haunts could be watched, his 
associates shadowed, the method and nature of the crime often bore within itself the 
recognizable identity of the criminal. He could often be captured on the scene of the 
crime, the fastest means of locomotion being either human or equine. Then, too, his 
means of travel, which were limited, could be traced with comparative ease. Should he 
escape to some other community, the danger of his capture was still imminent. Every 
stranger was a marked man, every newcomer aroused suspicion. 
1925 Proceeding, in Proceedings of the Annual Conventions of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1921-
1925, vol. 4 at 49 (New York, 1971); see also 1926 Proceeding, in Proceedings of the Annual Conventions of the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1926-1930, vol. 5, 56  (New York, 1971)(“Crime of yesterday, accordingly, 
was an entirely local matter—a Main street affair.”). 
12 John A. Fairlie, Police Administration, 16 Pol. Sci. Quarterly 1, 7-8 (1901); Raymond B. Fosdick, American 
Police Systems, 58-117 (1920); Roger Lane, Urban Police and Crime in Nineteenth-Century America, 1, in 15 Crime & 
Justice: Modern Policing (1992). 
13 See Sankar diss., 125-35. 
14 See Erik Larson, Devil in the White City: Murder, Magic, and Madness at the Fair That Changed America 
(2004). 




wet jurisdiction, prompting reformers to impose prohibition first at the state level and then 
nationally.15 The automotive revolution in transportation—Henry Ford perfected the Model T’s 
moving assembly line in 1914—magnified the challenges to law enforcement.16 From 1895 to 1929, 
the number of cars exploded from the single digits to more than 23 million. The automobile boom 
contributed to an increase in crime as the getaway facilitated the commission of age-old crimes like 
bank robberies, kidnapping, and murder.  
Cars also created a new crime: auto theft. The prominent criminal law scholar Jerome Hall 
may have found it “quite extraordinary that theft of automobiles should be of particular 
importance,” but he recognized that the phenomenon “loom[ed] up in unique importance.”17 
Striking the same note, a congressman from Missouri declared in 1919 that there was “no class of 
criminal enjoying more lucrative gain as a reward for their industry than the automobile thieves of 
the country.”18 Although mass production made cars much more affordable to a wider class of 
consumers, they were still among the most valuable assets for the average family. Motor cars were 
expensive enough and sufficiently necessary in many parts of the country to support a thriving 
market for secondhand cars. Standardized cars with standardized parts facilitated this secondary 
market, as did the automobile manufacturers’ disinclination to develop either locking devices or 
ways of identifying cars and confirming ownership. 
Crossing county, state, and even national boundaries became more frequent, and for some, a 
daily passage from home to work and back. Sophisticated auto theft rings took advantage of the 
variegated landscape in a federal system of government. They would steal cars in one state and sell 
them in another, where there was no record of the thefts.19 Operations near the Mexican or 
Canadian border were especially cunning. During National Prohibition, for example, bootleggers 
would steal a car in New York, drive to Canada, and sell it there. They could use the proceeds of the 
sale to purchase liquor in Canada, then steal another car, and transport the illicit goods back to the 
States, where they could sell the alcohol and the stolen car and make a tidy profit.20 A more 
recreational pattern, decried in California, was the “great spring drive”; according to the Los Angeles 
Times, thieves stole “the cars they intend to drive East with the coming of the first warm weather” 
and sold them when they got there.21 In 1926, the Chicago Daily Tribune noted these developments: 
while crime used to be “a local affair” when criminals “operated locally and disposed of their loot 
locally,” “[t]oday crime is a national affair, run on interstate lines, made so by the railroads and the 
automobile, principally the latter.”22  
 
15 See Richard Hamm, Shaping the Eighteenth. 
16 See Seo, Policing the Open Road. 
17 Jerome Hall, Theft, Law, and Society, 230-31 (1935); see United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 413 (1957) 
(citing Hall when interpreting what “stolen” means under the Dyer Act). On Jerome Hall, see Sarah A. Seo, Democratic 
Policing before the Due Process Revolution, 127 Yale L.J. 1246 (2019). 
18 C.R. House 5474. 
19 As Hoover reported in 1926, “We have bands of automobile thieves who steal machines in one state and 
pass them over to another band in another state to sell them.” 1926 Proceeding, in Proceedings of the Annual 
Conventions of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1926-1930, vol. 5 (New York, 1971), 56. 
20 Sauter, The Origin, 5. 
21 “Plan to Stop Car Stealing: Auto Club Considering Several Recommendations,” L.A. Times, Feb. 29, 1920, at 
VI1 (noting that “[l]enient jail sentences” “make auto thieving a pastime here”). 
22 “The Interstate Commerce of Crime,” Chicago Daily Tribune, June 17, 1926. 




Notwithstanding these changes, crime control remained mostly local during the automobile’s 
early years. Even in the first decades of the twentieth century, private groups took on most criminal 
investigations. When a vehicle was stolen, hapless owners would contact local authorities. But they 
also posted a reward for the recovery of their cars or, if they had auto theft insurance, had their 
insurers post it. Citizens and businesses soon came together in common cause. As Congressman 
Newman of Missouri observed, “[s]o frightful has this menace [auto theft] become that automobile 
clubs and automobile protective associations have been formed, and they have been joined by 
chambers of commerce and commercial clubs all over the country in an effort to stamp out this 
lawless industry.”23 
During this period of transition, citizens and private associations, as well as state and local 
governments, were quickly discovering their limits in a multi-jurisdictional country. Law officers 
whose authority covered only a single jurisdiction could not pursue bootleggers and highway 
robbers. The mobility of criminals also gave rise to the need to share information about runaways, 
fugitives, arrestees, prisoners, and the recently released.24 As one police chief observed, “professional 
thieves are constantly moving from one locality to another, one city to another, one State to another. 
These professionals make circuits and become national characters, traveling and depredating here, 
there, and everywhere.”25  
These social changes brought about by the mass production of the automobile prompted 
forty-seven progressive police chiefs to form the National Chiefs of Police Union in 1893 with the 
goal of improving “the detection and prevention of crime in the United States.”26 As its president 
explained in 1895, the organization arose from the “constant telegraphic correspondence” among 
“the police departments of the larger cities,” whose leaders recognized that “the effectiveness of one 
department depends upon the police system of other cities.”27 In an increasingly mobile world, they 
realized, local knowledge that remained local stymied investigations and preventive policing. 
One of the Union’s first agenda items was to create “the National Police Bureau” for “the 
practical exchange of ideas and information pertaining to police business.”28 In the beginning, that 
information focused on the identities of perpetrators based on the Bertillon system, developed in the 
1880s and relying on measurements from head to toe “based on the principle that no two adult 
creatures are alike.”29 By the early 1900s, the organization, renamed the International Association of 
Chiefs of Police (IACP), in recognition of the need to communicate with police agencies in foreign 
countries as well, set up a “bureau of criminal identification” and began collecting fingerprints.30 But 
the dues, about $25 a year, gathered from 200 departments were insufficient to pay for the 
 
23 C.R. House 5474. 
24 1924 Congressional hearing, 6 (NYC police commissioner explaining how a fugitive could commit crimes in 
several states without each state being aware of it). 
25 A Bill for the Creation of a National Bureau of Criminal Identification, in Proceedings of the Annual 
Conventions of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1893-1905, vol. 1 (New York, 1971), 20. 
26 “Chiefs of Police Coming,” The Wash. Post, Feb. 11, 1895. See also Sankar diss., 124-125. 
27 1895 Proceedings, in Proceedings of the Annual Conventions of the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police, 1893-1905, vol. 1 (New York, 1971), 9. 
28 “Chiefs of Police Coming.” 
29 1902 Proceedings, 18. 
30 1924 Congressional hearing, 33. 




distribution of that information.31 Also, without a critical mass of participating police departments or 
a central database available to law enforcement throughout the country, the effectiveness of the 
IACP’s bureau was limited.  
One possible solution was to establish information-sharing arrangements among the states, 
but that proved difficult in a federal system. The lack of state-to-state cooperation even where 
constitutionally mandated by the Extradition Clause and the commons problem of state funding for 
such arrangements presented nearly insurmountable obstacles. The fact that public and private 
institutions at the municipal or county levels were the real sites of criminal enforcement didn’t help 
either. Indeed, the IACP never approached the states for help in creating an infrastructure for the 
exchange of crime-related information. 
Instead, in 1901, local police chiefs asked the federal government for assistance in solving 
the coordination and funding problems; clearly, formal federalism considerations did not concern 
them as much as their practical needs. The IACP drafted a bill for Congress to establish “a National 
Bureau of Criminal Identification in connection with the Department of Justice” that would collect 
“plates, photographs, outline pictures, descriptions, information, and measurements of all persons 
who have been or may be convicted and imprisoned” for violating any laws of the United States and 
its “several States and Territories, or the [] municipalities thereof.”32 To convince Congress to pay 
for the new DOJ bureau, the IACP pledged that “the Government would receive a full reciprocal 
amount of aid and information” on federal crimes from local departments.33 “The whole 
arrangement,” it envisioned, “would constitute one great web which the malefactor could not elude, 
and bring the authorities everywhere, Government and State, into full sympathy and co-operation, 
the Government being amply repaid for the small expenditure.”34 
Congress, however, needed more persuading.35 To be sure, many congressmen supported 
the idea. The House Judiciary Committee reported favorably on the bill; it lifted phrases directly 
from the IACP’s bill to conclude that not only would the creation of “one great web which the 
malefactor could not elude” benefit the states, but that the federal government could also be “amply 
repaid for the small expenditure.”36 Indeed, the report pointed out that with identification 
information, police authorities throughout the country could help find military deserters. Moreover, 
the heads of the Secret Service, the Post Office, and the federal penitentiaries all gave “favorable and 
unqualified indorsement [sic]” because such a national bureau would place them “in closer touch 
with the police authorities, and a thorough cooperation [would] follow.”37 
 
31 Id. at 7, 21, 24, 67. 
32 1902 IACP Proceedings, at 14-15; see also 35 Cong. Rec. 5870 (May 23, 1902) (H. R. 100068). See also Letter 
from Richard Sylvester, Mayor and Superintendent of the Metropolitan Police Department, Urging Legislation Looking 
to the Establishment in Washington City of a Bureau to be Known as the National Bureau of Criminal Identification, to 
Senator George G. Vest (December 13, 1900), Document No. 43, 56th Congress 2d Session. 
33 Id. at 19. 
34 Id. 
35 See Mary M. Stolberg, Policing the Twilight Zone: Federalizing Crime Fighting during the New Deal, 7 J. of 
Policy Hist. 393, 395-396 (1995), on opposition to Bureau creation. 
36 Mr. Jenkins, Committee on the Judiciary, Report on National Bureau of Criminal Identification, Report No. 
429, 57th Congress, 1st Session (February 7, 1902), 3. 
37 Id. 




But those in opposition prevailed. The Senate Judiciary Committee “reported adversely” on 
the bill, which was thereafter “postponed indefinitely.”38 The absence of a report keeps us from 
knowing its reasoning. But the House’s report, which insisted defensively that it was “not proposed 
that the bureau shall be a detective agency,” provides some clues.39 A federal agency with the 
authority to compile and distribute criminal identification information would, some feared, come too 
close to a national police force, an abomination to Americans. And so for another two decades, the 
proposal would languish, and the IACP would continue to maintain its own voluntary network of 
information sharing. 
B. Congress Creates the Bureau and New Federal Crimes  
When Congress rejected the bill for a new DOJ bureau to take over the responsibilities of 
the IACP’s National Police Bureau, the federal government did not have a general criminal 
investigative force. It did not have many criminal laws either.40 The Justice Department, not created 
until 1870, was responsible for the prosecution of a relatively narrow range of cases that came 
mostly from the Department of Treasury and Post Office.41 Investigations, to the extent they 
occurred, were pursued by private detectives or Secret Service agents borrowed from the Treasury 
Department.42 
In 1907, Attorney General Charles Bonaparte (the Emperor’s grand-nephew) called on 
Congress to remedy this “anomaly” and to establish a “permanent detective force.”43 But Congress 
balked at the proposal. The objection was framed as a matter of principle: the United States never 
had a general police system that spied on its citizens because it was antithetical to American 
freedom.44 As the debates over the IACP’s bill indicate, centralized police forces were anathema. 
Federal criminal interventions were also politically fraught, especially in the South, where concerns 
that the feds would undermine Jim Crow ran deep.45 Not only did Congress reject Bonaparte’s 
proposal, but so strong was its fear of a political police force that it also moved to preclude the 
 
38 Cong. Rec. 1226, February 3, 1902. 
39 House Judiciary Committee report, 4. 
40 See Daniel C. Richman, Kate Stith & William J. Stuntz, Defining Federal Crimes (2d ed. 2019). 
41 See, e.g. Annual Report of the Attorney General, 1905, at 114-121. 
42 Annual Report of the Attorney General, 1906, at 92.. 
43 Annual Report of the Attorney General of the United States for the Year 1907, at 10 (1907). 
44 Lowenthal, 3-4. 
45 Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Politics of Judicial Interpretation: The Federal Courts, Department of Justice, 
and Civil Rights, 1866–1876 (2005); Robert M. Goldman, A Free Ballot and a Fair Count: The Department of Justice 
and the Enforcement of Voting Rights in the South, 1877–1893 (2001); Stephen Cresswell, Enforcing the Enforcement 
Acts: The Department of Justice in Northern Mississippi, 1870-90, 53 J. Southern Hist. 421 (1987); Gautham Rao, The 
Federal Posse Comitatus Doctrine: Slavery, Compulsion, and Statecraft in Mid-Nineteenth Century America, 26 L. & 
Hist. Rev. 1 (2008); Scott C. James & Brian L. Lawson, “The Political Economy of Voting Rights Enforcement in 
America’s Gilded Age: Electoral College Competition, Partisan Commitment, and the Federal Election Law,” 93 Am. 
Pol. Sci. Rev. 115 (1999); Wilbur R. Miller, The Revenue: Federal Law Enforcement in the Mountain South, 1870-1900, 
55 J. South. Hist. 195 (1989); Jonathan Obert, A Fragmented Force, The Evolution of Federal Law Enforcement in the 
United States, 1870-1900, 29 J. Policy Hist. 640 (2017). 




Department’s use of Secret Service agents. US Attorney for the Southern District of New York 
Henry Stimson worried that this move could destroy the “fighting power of his office.”46 
After Congress adjourned for the summer, Bonaparte, encouraged by President Theodore 
Roosevelt, reached into DOJ funds and quietly created an investigative unit.47 The following year, in 
1909, Congress post facto authorized the Bureau of Investigation after its members were shamed for 
opposing a federal law enforcement agency in the middle of an unfolding congressional scandal.48 
But it received promises that the Bureau would not become a spy force and would simply support 
the rather narrow criminal mission of the Justice Department.49 As Bonaparte told Congress, “the 
detective force which minds its own business, and attends to that, and does nothing else, is more 
effective as a means of suppressing crime than one which is used for any extraneous purpose.”50 
Given that the Bureau lacked arrest powers, its ancillary status could not have been clearer. 
Although the Bureau was created when federal criminal laws were few in number, the 
exigencies of an (auto)mobile society soon led to a spate of criminal legislation. In 1910, Congress 
passed the Mann Act, which criminalized the interstate transportation of any “woman or girl” for 
“prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose.”51 Four years later in 1914 came the 
Harrison Anti-Narcotics Act and another five years later, in 1919, the National Motor Vehicle Theft 
Act (the Dyer Act), which criminalized the interstate transportation of stolen vehicles.52 That same 
year, the nation ratified the Eighteenth Amendment to end the production, shipment, and sale of 
alcohol and, in 1920, the Volstead Act put National Prohibition into effect.53 These new laws 
stretched long-established bounds of federalism by involving the national government in 
conventionally local matters, a development made necessary by an increasingly mobile world.54 
 
46 Cummings and McFarland, Federal Justice, 377. 
47 Annual Report of the Attorney General of the United States for the Year 1909, at 8-10 (1909); see also  
 John Allen Noakes, “Enforcing Domestic Tranquility: State Building and the Origin of the (Federal) Bureau of 
Investigation, 1908-1920,” at 72-85 (1993 U. Penn Ph.D. Sociology dissertation); David Joseph Williams, “Without 
Understanding: The FBI and Political Surveillance, 1908-1941,” at 32 (Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of New Hamp. 1981) 
(maintaining that “at no time” did congressional critics “advance their proposals to protect themselves from possible 
criminal investigation”). 
48 Lowenthal, **; see also Cummings and McFarland, Federal Justice, 380; Noakes, at 80-85. 
49 Fears that the Bureau would become a roving spy force, like the Pinkerton National Detective Agency, at the 
service of the powerful likely loomed large. See David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1165, 1213-16 
(1999) (describing hostility to Pinkertons in Congress and elsewhere during the 1890s); see also Robert P. Weiss, Private 
Detective Agencies and Labour Discipline in the United States, 1855-1946, 29 Hist. J. 87 (1986); Charles K. Hyde, 
Undercover and Underground: Labor Spies and Mine Management in the Early Twentieth Century, 60 Bus. Hist. Rev. 1 
(1986). 
50 Stockham at 57 (quoting Hearings before Subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations, Sundry 
Civil Appropriation Bill for 1910, 1003 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1909)). 
51 Mann Act. 
52 Harrison Act; Dyer Act. 
53 Volstead Act. 
54 The new federal criminal laws also showed how notions of racial threat that generally reinforced Southern 
hostility to federal power could be deployed to counsel just such authority—so long as it would be mediated by local 
officials. While a long effort by the NAACP for anti-lynching legislation never got past the Senate, nativist concerns 
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Criminal laws, however, don’t enforce themselves. Congress appropriated more money to 
federal agencies, especially the Justice Department, to enforce the new statutes, but it was never 
enough. As a result, the DOJ and its Bureau could pursue their assignments only with collaborations 
with state and local agencies and with the help of citizens and private organizations. The American 
Protective League (APL) is a well-known example of a voluntary association that aided federal law 
enforcement.55 Its members reported subversive activities and enforced alien registration during 
World War I, and their “slacker raids” resulted in the detention of tens of thousands of draft-age 
citizens, often at bayonet point.56 President Woodrow Wilson had reservations about the APL’s 
involvement, but his attorney general persuaded him “that the assistance of APL volunteers was the 
only way the Bureau could meet the rush of war-time work without adding unduly to the permanent 
federal bureaucracy.”57 This was so even with soaring congressional appropriations from 1916 to 
1919.58 Historian Lisa McGirr has also documented how a volunteer army, which included the Ku 
Klux Klan, took up the enforcement of National Prohibition. Even though the Prohibition Bureau 
was more than four times the size of the Bureau of Investigation,59 its head declared that his 
Prohibition agents could fulfill their task only with “the closest cooperation between the Federal 
officers and all other law-enforcing officers—State, county, and municipal.”60 
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Without cooperation from local partners, not only would the federal government’s 
enforcement efforts be limited, but the very legitimacy of the federal laws could be compromised. 
National Prohibition offered a cautionary tale.61 In the face of local intransigence, President 
Coolidge argued that the Eighteenth Amendment put “a concurrent duty on the States.”62 The 
Commissioner of Prohibition likewise insisted that there was “no doubt” that states were required 
“to exercise in their appropriate sphere of action the full police powers of the State, in order to 
properly discharge their obligations under the Eighteenth Amendment.”63 But many states and local 
governments, particularly in large cities, ignored these claims. New York City police, many from 
ethnic, working-class communities that viewed Prohibition as an indictment against their way of life, 
neither cared to assist the feds nor were inclined to obey the law themselves.64 Even after the Anti-
Saloon League, another voluntarist organization, successfully lobbied for the Mullan-Gage 
Enforcement Law in New York, which squarely obliged the police to participate in the Prohibition 
project,65 many officers still dragged their feet or took bribes. Without state and local participation, 
Prohibition was doomed to failure.66 The New York example foreshadowed what might happen 
throughout the country.67 In 1922, New Yorkers voted out Governor Nathan Miller, who had given 
them the Mullan-Gage Law, and replaced him with Al Smith, a committed “wet.”68 The new 
governor quickly won repeal of the state’s Prohibition enforcement statute, describing the 
Eighteenth Amendment as “not a command but an option.”69 
By contrast, enforcement of the Mann Act provided an example of a fruitful relationship 
between federal and local actors. Stanley Finch, the Bureau’s first chief, who became the special 
commissioner for the Mann Act in 1912, established a vast network of local, part-time, and 
minimally compensated white-slave officers, usually local lawyers.70 Together, they obtained more 
than 300 convictions between September 1912 and September 1913 alone.71 Local support also 
rebutted claims that the federal government was meddling in a presumptively local matter. An early 
challenge, which “condemn[ed the Mann Act] as a subterfuge and an attempt to interfere with the 
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police power of the states to regulate the morals of their citizens,” lost in the Supreme Court.72 The 
police themselves saw no troubling intrusion, just an opportunity for collaboration. At the 1913 
IACP convention, President Richard H. Sylvester touted the extensive cooperation between the 
Bureau and locals. Police chiefs brought information about houses of “ill-repute” to Finch’s 
attention, then the feds took action. He noted that in his own jurisdiction of Washington, DC, 
“several” cases had been “disposed of by the United States authorities and the police have been 
foremost in bringing them to the front.”73 
Scholars have pointed to the Mann Act or the Volstead Act as turning points in the 
federalization of law enforcement.74 Yet one should avoid conflating legislation with enforcement. In 
fact, the enforcement of these new laws actually highlights federal dependency. A perennially 
resource-strapped federal agency, by depending on support from citizens, paid a price when it came 
to the control of its agenda. Without a sufficient force of its own, Finch’s team depended on 
whatever information they received about potential Mann Act violations. Notwithstanding the 
Bureau’s desire to focus on commercial prostitution and to avoid policing morals, complaints of 
sexual misbehavior streaming from individual citizens and moral reformers necessarily determined 
the Bureau’s caseload.75 Women seeking redress against lovers who spurned them, parents wanting 
to control daughters, and judgmental neighbors all saw the Mann Act as their tool. Given the 
drumbeat of these civilian complaints and calls from reformers demanding prosecution, it is not 
surprising that Mann Act cases skewed toward immoral behavior and less toward interstate 
prostitution rings that were harder to investigate.76 Dependence on others for information deprived 
the Bureau of agenda control, but the corollary was support for that agenda and for the Bureau 
itself. When this collaboration was not forthcoming, as Prohibition authorities discovered, no 
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realistically conceivable amount of federal funding could have supported the agencies tasked with 
enforcement. 
Neither could the passions of a discrete contingent of crusaders sustain the Bureau’s growth 
over a longer period. It quietly kept its distance from Prohibition enforcement and, once the white-
slavery scare dissipated, the Bureau’s appropriations stagnated.77 National security work was similarly 
cyclical; in fact, the Red Scare actually demonstrates its double-edged nature. On the one hand, 
helping the war effort and going after radicals made the Bureau seem indispensable to key national 
goals. On the other, the Bureau would regularly find that political commitment to its national-
security portfolio ebbed and flowed.78 The Armistice put an end to the Bureau’s reliance on the APL 
and was about to lead to a considerable reduction in its force until a series of bombing attempts 
targeted administration officials, including the new Attorney General Palmer.79 Notwithstanding the 
resulting hysteria, much of it manufactured, the Bureau remained small.80 From 1919 to 1920, staff 
at headquarters numbered only thirty-one, and just sixty-one special agents worked in the field full-
time on radical activities.81 Given their paltry numbers, they had to rely on local police forces in its 
many raids on strikers, anarchists, and communists.82 By fall of 1920, Republican President-elect 
Harding would declare that “too much has been said about Bolshevism in America,” and budget 
strings were tightened.83 Given the fickleness of political winds and congressional ambivalence about 
the Bureau’s work, especially during the civil-liberties backlash over the excesses of the slacker 
raids,84 the Bureau’s longevity—and appropriations—would have to be based on a steadier stream of 
work that not only mattered to everyday life for ordinary citizens but also transcended politics du 
jour.85 
II. Collaborative Federalism in Action 
As the divergent experiences with the Mann Act and the Volstead Act demonstrated, 
working together with local actors was indispensable to federal law enforcement. The Bureau’s Dyer 
Act cases, which provided a steady line of business justifying the fledgling agency’s existence, also 
depended on relationships of mutual exchange, or “collaborative federalism.” Part II.A explains how 
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the Bureau’s work on the Dyer Act offered police and insurance companies a solution to the 
problem of gathering criminal information in the automotive age and what the Bureau received in 
exchange. Part II.B then examines the parallel story of other information-sharing projects that the 
Bureau pursued, which further illustrates collaborative federalism in action. By fostering cooperative 
alliances with local partners with these projects, the Bureau was able to expand its capacity beyond 
its small size and to pursue the high-profile cases that the American public increasingly expected the 
federal government to solve. They also solidified the role of local police departments as 
indispensable federal interlocutors. 
A. Enforcing the Dyer Act 
i. What Locals Needed 
Mass-produced cars appeared on Main Streets and interstate highways just as reforming 
police chiefs were beginning to coordinate their activities. The decentralized organization of law 
enforcement was ill-suited to pursue motorists who could flee their jurisdiction on a moment’s 
notice. City or county governments were reluctant to spend money enlarging their police 
departments to go hunting for criminals who might not fall entirely within their purview. It also did 
not make sense for municipalities to spend more money as long as the pursuit and prosecution of 
crime was largely a private responsibility. As a result, insurance companies were at the front lines of 
fighting auto theft. Their main strategy was to post reward notices within a certain geographic range, 
usually within a radius of 150 miles or so from the point of theft since early cars on bad roads could 
travel only so far.86  
By 1912, a group of insurers decided to economize their efforts by forming the American 
Protective and Information Bureau (APIB), which circulated a single report for all the stolen 
vehicles they insured and served as an information clearinghouse.87 Then in 1918, APIB manager E. 
L. Rickards and Michael Doyle, director of the American Automobile Insurance Company in St. 
Louis, Missouri, came up with the idea of a national law criminalizing the transportation of stolen 
vehicles in interstate traffic, believing that “Federal level involvement” would make a difference in 
combating the problem.88 Conveniently, Doyle knew his congressman, Leonidas Dyer. The 
following year in 1919, Dyer introduced a bill “to punish the transportation of stolen motor vehicles 
in interstate or foreign commerce.”89 
The House’s discussion of the bill centered on the question: “How can a Federal law punish 
a man for stealing an automobile?”90 After all, theft was a local matter and already criminalized under 
local laws. The IACP, unsure whether Congress had the power to criminalize auto theft, instead 
suggested that the solution might be for all states to enact a uniform law, a common solution to 
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interstate problems during this period.91 But in the era of the Mann Act and National Prohibition—
within three weeks of the House’s debate, Congress would pass the Volstead Act to enforce the 
Eighteenth Amendment—it did not take much to convince most national legislators that the federal 
government had the authority to criminalize the transport of stolen cars across state lines.92 One 
congressman argued by analogy that “[i]f the transportation of a woman from one State to another, 
by means of an automobile, for prostitution, constitutes interstate commerce, then how can it be 
argued, with any show of color, that the driving of a stolen automobile from one State to another 
for profit is not interstate commerce?”93 Several of his colleagues also pointed out that the “favorite 
place for such thefts is near a State line.”94 Dyer maintained that auto thefts were “particularly” 
common in the “cities of the Middle West,” especially in his home state Missouri, and that “State 
laws upon the subject have been inadequate to meet the evil.”95 Chief Justice Taft would repeat these 
arguments in 1924 to uphold the Dyer Act, writing that “[t]he quick passage of the machines”—as 
cars were often called then—“into another state helps to conceal the trail of the thieves, gets the 
stolen property into another police jurisdiction and facilitates the finding of a safe place in which to 
dispose of the booty at a good price. This is a gross misuse of interstate commerce.”96 
Dyer and Newton also argued that the new bill fell comfortably within interstate commerce 
in the more traditional sense by invoking the interests of the insurance industry. In the face of a high 
risk of loss, “almost every owner in the land [held] a larceny policy.”97 But this was also why 
providing insurance against auto theft proved to be a losing business proposition. “One of the 
reasons why this legislation is needed so badly,” Dyer pointed out, was because “automobile theft 
insurance has advanced in the past year over 100 per cent on cars costing from $500 to $900.”98 The 
economics of this situation especially affected ordinary citizens, for “cheaper cars are stolen,” 
making it “almost impossible for the owners of these cheaper cars to obtain at any rate automobile 
theft insurance.”99 Given the recent precedents of the Mann Act and the Volstead Act, as well as the 
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broad reach of auto theft on the material lives of many citizens, it took just one month for Dyer’s 
bill to become the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, or the Dyer Act, on October 29, 1919.  
Congress, however, gave no thought to how the new law would be enforced. The closest 
that legislators came to such a discussion was when Representative Newton noted that with the new 
law, “the Federal grand jury is empowered to investigate such larcenies.”100 Once the Dyer Act was 
passed, its enforcement appears to have been an open question. Two months after enactment, the 
Automobile Underwriters Detective Bureau wrote to the attorney general inquiring “how a peace 
officer should proceed in making an arrest and prosecuting under this Act.”101 Another insurance 
man wrote to the DOJ, “desirous of being sworn in as a special agent … to serve without 
compensation for the purpose of running down … thieves who have been … transporting cars 
from one state to another.”102 On the APIB’s part, its leaders were under the misapprehension that 
US Marshals were supposed to be pursuing Dyer Act cases, and so were dismayed at the “laxity” 
that “existed on the part of the Federal Authorities in the enforcement” of the new law.103 
To make the most of their lobbying efforts, APIB manager Rickards and an official from the 
Chicago Crime Commission met with Bureau Chief William Burns and his assistant J. Edgar Hoover 
in 1921 “to discuss methods of closer co-operation between the Department of Justice Agents and 
the Association [and] more effectual enforcement of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act.”104 Out 
of that meeting came clarification of the roles of the various stakeholders in Dyer Act cases.105 For 
its part, the APIB would serve as “a clearinghouse for information in connection with stolen 
automobiles” and provide expertise on investigatory methods.106 For instance, it published the 
“Reference Book” that catalogued all the factory numbers and “secret identification numbers” 
stamped on different car makes and models.107 The insurance cohort would also pass on reports of 
stolen vehicles from their claimholders to law enforcement. This role was to be shared with local 
police departments whose officers discovered potential Dyer Act violations during their routine 
patrols. 
For their part, the police did not hesitate to involve the feds. Prosecutions were much easier 
to bring under the Dyer Act than under state larceny laws, which required proof of intent “to 
permanently deprive the owner of his car” and, as a result, did not cover joyriding.108 Dyer Act 
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violations were also easier to prove than accompanying state crimes like robbery, and local officials 
were more than happy to pass along any case involving a car that crossed a state border.109 But the 
Dyer Act’s main value lay in coordinating law enforcement efforts among jurisdictions, when police 
in one locality apprehended someone with a car stolen from another locality, or when police in a 
theft victim’s state needed help from the recovering state. As Hoover explained, even simple Dyer 
Act investigations generally required “interstate inquiries, which the Bureau makes through its 
various field offices.”110 He continued: 
The state authorities would be extremely handicapped … by lack of 
investigative authority extending from one locality to another, by lack of 
funds requisite to subpoena witnesses from one locality to another, by the 
necessity of resorting to a complicated system of removal hearings, 
extradition writs and other legal necessities which it would be necessary to 
invoke and by what I feel sure would be a very positive disinclination on 
the part of various local authorities to incur the expense and trouble to 
properly enforce the Act where local individuals or individuals of local 
prominence were not involved.111 
Given the challenges that Hoover described, the Bureau’s role in Dyer Act cases often amounted to 
“packaging” information across jurisdictions and then “gifting” the cases back to local authorities to 
prosecute. Hoover noted in 1929 that “in some instances we find that prosecution is instituted in 
State Courts under local Statutes, particularly where the case holds some local interest or where 
important witnesses are readily available without the State incurring a large expenditure.”112 
Regardless of whether the prosecution was ultimately brought in state or federal court, the Bureau’s 
involvement in auto theft cases presented a solution to local police departments’ coordination 
problem. Federal facilitation via the Dyer Act substituted for interstate information sharing and 
clunky extradition procedures.113 
In 1935, a columnist close to Hoover described this “service” aspect of the Dyer Act in the 
following way: 
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Before the passage of this act, the run of bureau cases was tied tightly to the 
business of the Federal Government: there was little opportunity to be of 
assistance to State and local law-enforcement agencies. The new law 
widened tremendously the scope of activities. True, if a man robbed a bank, 
that was not the bureau’s business since the robbery of even a national 
bank [] was not a Federal crime until less than two years ago. But if that 
robber stole a car during that holdup and crossed a State line, he then 
became a fugitive from Federal justice. … A Federal chase for a violator of 
the national vehicle theft act has often led to the solution of a local mystery. 
A motivating crime is found, the theft of the car being the act of the 
moment, impelled by something quite different—usually the desire to 
escape from some other law violation. The Federal agency therefore 
frequently becomes an assisting agency to the enforcement bodies of the 
Nation, later withdrawing from the case if the State charge is the more 
serious.114 
In this account, the Bureau applied the new federal criminal laws in order to help, not to encroach, 
local domains. Even diligent police chiefs sometimes found themselves relying on the feds given the 
coordination challenges. At an IACP conference in 1927, Chief J. W. Higgins of Buffalo, New York, 
complained that “other cities are not co-operating with us to the extent we co-operate with them.”115 
Fortunately, the Bureau could step in to help. 
In time, local protocols instructing officers to reach out to the feds whenever they recovered 
an out-of-state stolen car became common.116 When, in 1927, a Martinsburg, West Virginia, 
constable found an abandoned car with Florida plates, he scribbled a note to the Justice 
Department, which got passed to Hoover, who, in turn, assured the assistant attorney general for the 
Criminal Division that the matter would receive the Bureau’s full attention.117 The constable appears 
to have found that car by himself, but Justice Department correspondence indicates that local 
recoveries were often spearheaded by insurance company representatives accompanied by local 
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police, who then passed the case on to the feds.118 In fact, just about all Dyer Act cases came from 
local officials. And there were many; according to one insurance agent, out of the 10,505,660 cars in 
the country in 1921, 60,145 had been stolen, and 43,664 had been recovered.119 Far from intruding 
on local matters, Dyer Act cases amounted to the federal collection and packaging of information 
for the benefit of all concerned. Significantly, it was the feds, not the states, that were able to 
provide this service, and it was the feds, not the states, to whom local police departments were 
obliged. 
ii. What the Bureau Got in Return 
Auto theft cases made up a significant portion of the Bureau’s docket. For example, in 1922, 
Dyer Act prosecutions comprised 43.74 percent of the Bureau’s total convictions (see Table 1). That 
year, Chief Burns testified at a House appropriations hearing that the increasing number of Dyer Act 
cases reflected “a marked tendency on the part of State authorities to shift [] responsibility on[to] 
Federal authorities.”120 The next Bureau chief, J. Edgar Hoover, embraced the tendency even more 
enthusiastically. After Burns’ resignation in 1924, the APIB’s annual report noted that it “received 
excellent co-operation from Mr. Wm. J. Burns, Former Director, but the present Director, Mr. J. E. 
Hoover, is more intensely interested in the enforcement of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act 
and fully realizes the effect of automobile thievery on general crime conditions.”121 By 1929, the 
2,123 Dyer Act convictions constituted more than half of the 3,950 Justice Department convictions 
(another 457 were under the Mann Act).122 After reading the Bureau’s annual report for 1937-1938, 
the celebrated newspaperman Damon Runyon remarked, “What interests us as much as anything 
else is the way those G-fellows go after automobile thieves.”123 
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Table 1. Breakdown of Total Bureau Convictions.124 
 




It wasn’t that the Bureau lacked other matters crying out for its investigative attention. As 
David Grann recounts in Killers of the Flower Moon, in the spring of 1923, when the Osage Tribal 
Council appealed to the Justice Department to investigate a growing spate of murders targeting its 
members, Chief Burns dispatched agents to pursue desultory inquiries largely at the tribe’s 
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expense.126 Hoover, on becoming director, continued the investigation, but with an inadequacy that 
Grann makes clear in sad detail. Because local white officials were complicit in the Osage murders, 
these cases did not offer the Bureau the upside of Dyer Act cases: the opportunity to pursue easier 
cases that forged collaborative relationships. 
Hoover collaborated not simply because locals sought federal help. He also understood the 
benefit to the Bureau. Most foundationally, its work on Dyer Act cases justified the agency’s 
existence. Testifying at a House appropriations hearing in 1926, Hoover mentioned having “just 
received” an annual report from the Theft Committee of the National Automobile Underwriters 
Conference, which highlighted how the most recent fine and recovery data “prove conclusively that 
the Department of Justice, Bureau of Investigation, is enforcing the national motor vehicle theft act 
and your committee firmly believes that this arm of the Government is serving the public 100 
percent.”127 Hoover was not shy about deploying this broad-based industry support—and the steady 
stream of statistics—during congressional appropriations hearings. Nor was he even original. 
Attorney General Daugherty in 1922 had touted both “the value of the stolen motor vehicles 
recovered by the Bureau of Investigation” and the “[e]xcellent cooperation” between DOJ agents, 
“peace officers throughout the United States,” and “the insurance companies writing auto theft 
insurance.”128 
In appreciation for the Bureau’s assistance in auto theft cases, local departments often 
reciprocated when the Bureau needed their help. An assistant director noted in 1930 that “the 
bureau’s representatives in various sections of the country are dependent in very many instances 
upon the good will of sheriffs’ offices and other law-enforcement officials for cooperative support 
in the conduct of investigations.”129 Hoover further explained to Congress how the Bureau’s close 
relationships with local police saved money; instead of sending an agent from Dallas all the way to 
the Panhandle to check out a subject as part of a routine investigation, an agent could simply wire 
the police chief or sheriff who would do it for the Bureau “without any cost to us.”130 It was thus 
through the Bureau’s service to commercial interests and local law enforcement that the fledgling 
agency was able to expand its capacity beyond its small size and limited funds.131  
Local assistance was also crucial to the Bureau’s ability to pursue its own investigations and 
to demonstrate its effectiveness to a public that was increasingly calling for federal action in cases 
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involving jurisdiction-crossing gangsters, bank robbers, and kidnappers.132 Even President Herbert 
Hoover, stalwart defender of local rule, could not ignore these demands. In 1930, he announced that 
the federal government would provide reinforcements in “an intensified cooperative drive against 
racketeering in Chicago and elsewhere.”133 This announcement prompted newspapers to report that 
“the nation wars on racketeering,” indeed, it was “more than a war, it is a revolution … against 
gangster and hoodlum rule.”134 Anxieties about crime reached fever pitch in 1932, when Charles 
Lindbergh’s twenty-month-old son was kidnapped from his own home.135 When the baby’s body 
was found two months after the kidnapping, the public demanded a national response.136 
Congress promptly considered a bill to make the transportation of kidnapped persons across 
state lines a federal offense.137 Despite the new law, banner headlines continued during Roosevelt’s 
first year in office, in 1933. In the June “Kansas City massacre,” a group of notorious gangsters 
ambushed law enforcement officers and left an agent and three police officers dead during an 
attempt to free one of their own in federal custody.138 In July, “Machine Gun” Kelly kidnapped an 
oil tycoon for ransom.139 Later that year, John Dillinger and his crew killed the Lima, Ohio, sheriff 
during a jailbreak, launching a nationwide manhunt for the outlaw.140 Responding to this breakdown 
in law and order, Roosevelt’s attorney general, Homer Cummings, rolled out a “twelve point plan 
for crime prevention” as part of the new administration’s “war on crime.”141 
Although the Roosevelt administration, unlike its predecessor, envisioned a robust national 
state to tackle the problems of modern society,142 Congress did not match the Bureau’s growing 
jurisdiction with commensurate appropriations. With insufficient agents in the field, the Bureau’s 
collaborative relationships with local departments, cultivated through its “service” cases under the 
Dyer Act, came in handy. Not only did local assistance extend the Bureau’s reach, it also allowed the 
Bureau to project an outsized image of its capacity, offering reassurance to a public that was 
increasingly expecting the feds to fight crime.  
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The cooperative nature of Dyer Act cases also neutralized any potential disruption to the 
Bureau’s relationship with locals when it swooped in to take over higher profile cases.143 The Bureau 
pursued some noted Bad Guys and, to the extent possible, maintained control over those cases, 
both to ensure success and to credibly claim credit. To the extent possible is a critical caveat, for the 
Bureau could make its cases only with considerable cooperation from the same local authorities it 
wanted in the shadows. The Bureau’s assiduous work on auto theft cases would more than offset 
these informational and resource “withdrawals” from its local counterparts.144 
The pursuit of the infamous gangster John Dillinger, who had committed multiple Dyer Act 
violations (a fact always noted in the Bureau’s case files), illustrates the fine line that Hoover had to 
walk between showcasing the Bureau’s effectiveness and appeasing locals. When Tucson, Arizona, 
police apprehended Dillinger in January 1934, Hoover publicly praised the work of the city and 
county peace offices.145 But in private, he allowed others to give credit to the Bureau. When the 
president of a “scientific protection firm” congratulated Hoover on the success of “your men” and 
voiced his “suspicion” that Hoover had directed “the credit” to the local police, Hoover was careful 
not to correct the writer’s misimpression.146 The writer added, “I’m sure this will pay you many times 
in securing the co-operation of the local police departments with your men.” Hoover agreed that 
“this practice on the part of newspapers will aid materially in securing the cooperation of the local 
and Federal authorities.”147 
Maintaining tight Bureau control over the Dillinger manhunt while not aggrieving state and 
local police could be challenging. IACP’s president quietly chided Hoover’s media-hogging, noting 
press reports of Hoover’s “constant and devoted search for Dillinger.”148 “While your faithful agents 
are making every effort to apprehend this man,” he allowed, “we likewise are making a similar 
effort,” he pointed out. He ended the letter by guaranteeing that the “entire force” of the IACP 
would be “at YOUR disposal.”149 For its part, the Bureau took pains to shoot down a press report 
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“to the effect that this Division has not cooperated with [local] law enforcement officials” because it 
had “caused considerable embarrassment particularly because it is not true . . . and secondarily 
because it has caused collaborators of the Division to feel offended and hurt.”150 
After Dillinger escaped from the Crown Point County Jail in Indiana with help from corrupt 
local officials in March and a failed attempt to capture him in April, Hoover demanded that “Public 
Enemy #1” be given priority over all other matters.151 When Special Agent Melvin Purvis asked 
headquarters whether “he should solicit the assistance of local law enforcement” when conducting 
raids in the case, Hoover sent instructions that “such raids should be conducted by Division Agents 
exclusively whenever possible,” with outreach to locals only if “absolutely necessary.”152 All the 
while, managing intergovernmental relations remained critical to the effort. When Indiana Governor 
McNutt told a Bureau official that his “chief desire is to have a member of the State Police present 
when Dillinger was captured,” the official assured him that the Bureau would call “whenever 
possible.” But the official took care to substitute the state director of public safety, whom the 
Bureau knew and trusted, for the high-profile state police captain whom the governor had 
suggested.153 Ultimately, it was another Indiana force, the East Chicago police, that provided the 
critical information. They had an informant in contact with Dillinger, and two officers were eager to 
help if they could “work with” the Bureau.154 Dillinger was ambushed at the Biograph Theater days 
later.155 As this turn of events illustrates, while the Bureau could handle its relationships with state 
police agencies, dependence on local police was virtually non-negotiable. Even with thirty-eight 
agents assigned full-time,156 the Bureau would not have been able to track Dillinger without 
considerable assistance from local police. 
This reliance on locals explains why the Bureau did not pause its work on Dyer Act cases 
even during wartime; more than ever, it needed to keep cultivating the exchange of mutual benefit. 
It also needed to appease Congress, and Hoover continued to feature Dyer Act recovery figures as 
justification for the Bureau’s appropriations.157 After the war, the Bureau ramped up its internal 
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security operations and belatedly began to focus on organized crime and civil rights violations.158 
Even amid these forays, however, Dyer Act cases continued to provide a ground bass, a steady 
source of easily obtained statistics justifying appropriations for legislators skeptical of the Bureau’s 
other work.159 Indeed, as the war ended, Hoover was quick to note that auto thefts were starting to 
spike.160 In 1946, when Hoover asked for an additional 3,000 agents, he noted that each agent was 
currently handling an average of 19.09 cases and reported that Dyer Act cases (among others) were 
bound to increase. These ritual supplications before Congress, with Bureau officials citing its service 
to local departments, continued until the late 1960s. 
B. The National Identification and Information Division 
Even as Bureau agents spent an outsized proportion of their time on Dyer Act cases, the 
agency became even more directly involved in the collection of criminal information through its 
management of identification data and crime statistics, the latter ultimately becoming the Uniform 
Crime Reporting system used today. The management of both datasets not only gave the Bureau 
another opportunity to serve local departments, but it also put the agency at the forefront of a larger 
effort to gather information about crime and criminals (and many non-criminals, too).161 
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The power that came with control over information began not with any grand schemes of J. 
Edgar Hoover but with local police departments. In 1921, twenty years after it unsuccessfully 
proposed “a National Bureau of Criminal Identification” to Congress, the IACP tried again, this 
time with the Bureau’s assistance. After meeting with IACP representatives, Chief William Burns 
announced his intention to establish a national fingerprint registry.162 Two years later, the IACP 
“unanimously adopted” resolutions to transfer its records, all 138,000 of them, to the DOJ before 
Congress had even authorized the federal agency to collect them.163 Burns, also impatient with 
congressional inaction, unilaterally ordered all records from the federal prison in Leavenworth to be 
transferred to Washington.164 FBI critic Max Lowenthal would later claim that the Bureau had taken 
over the IACP and Leavenworth fingerprint registries to “eliminate competition,” but the Bureau’s 
“customers” were fully complicit.165 These moves also forced Congress’s hand, resulting in hearings 
on the matter the following year. 
Concerns about centralized policing continued to loom large during the 1924 hearings. A 
national criminal identification database seemed too similar to the registration of citizens maintained 
by centralized states in Europe.166 Several members of Congress asked whether the project would 
lead to a national police force and how it would affect the federal-state relationship on law 
enforcement matters, particularly at a time when National Prohibition was straining that 
relationship. House members also considered under what authority the federal government could 
“compel the chiefs of police commissioners to furnish this information to [a federal] official.”167 It 
seemed necessary, according to one representative, to connect the “constitutional grant of power” to 
“the purpose of obtaining information” for an existing federal department fulfilling its duties under 
federal laws.168 This was where the passage of time and intervening events made a difference. In 
1901, when the IACP first proposed the bill, the Mann Act was nearly a decade away.169 By 1924, 
when Congress reconsidered the bill, the federal government had not only the Mann Act but also 
the Volstead Act and the Dyer Act. Chief Burns testified that in the year since the IACP handed 
over its information bureau to the DOJ, it was already proving to be effective in solving federal 
crimes, such as “stealing automobiles, the Mann Act, [and] impersonations.”170 Convinced, Congress 
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established the National Identification Division in July 1924 and housed it in the Bureau of 
Investigation.171  
Although the federal government’s own needs helped persuade a wary Congress, the needs 
of local governments were more critical to sustaining congressional support. An important part of 
the Bureau’s appropriations strategy was to mobilize local enforcers who had sway with Congress. 
Even after congressional authorization, the IACP continued to remind its members to “enlighten 
Senators and Representatives in Congress from their respective districts regarding the success and 
value of the Division of Information and Identification, that they may readily comprehend its worth 
and assist in its upbuilding.”172 Hoover himself encouraged the locals to take pride and ownership 
over the criminal registry system, telling IACP members at its 1925 convention that the “Division of 
Identification is your child.”173 Congressional support for federal law enforcement projects would 
come and go, but legislators’ support for the police departments primarily responsible for protecting 
their constituents was an enduring feature of the political landscape. 
The mutuality of benefits was precisely why the Identification Division proved so successful. 
Just two years after Congress authorized it, Hoover announced that he could “now say that we have 
achieved a practically [sic] unanimity of support for the National Division of Identification of all the 
Chiefs of Police of all the cities in the United States and Canada of large size.”174 He was particularly 
pleased to report that even New York and Chicago—the two cities that had the most fractious 
relationship with federal authorities because of National Prohibition—had come around and 
“developed a close relationship of mutual interest and cooperation” with the Bureau.175 Moving 
forward, the goal was now “to secur[e] every possible extension of the scope, influence and value of 
the National Division of Identification” by entering “into continued relations with the sheriffs of 
every county, in each state of the country.”176 
Managing the Identification Division extended “the scope, influence and value” of the 
Bureau as well. Police departments grateful for its services returned the favor by gathering 
information for the Bureau when needed. As one pundit put it, “When the local officials are puzzled 
the national bureau clears up the doubt. When Uncle Sam is puzzled, he can call on any of the local 
officials for information.”177 As historian Richard Powers puts it, the collaboration placed Hoover 
“at the head of a law enforcement community drawn into a cooperative network.”178  
The Bureau soon expanded the sorts of data it was collecting beyond criminal identification. 
When IACP leaders testified before Congress in 1924, they suggested that the Identification 
Division might also keep track of “daily lists of stolen automobiles, names, numbers, and data that 
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might lead to recovery,” and more generally, “reports of crimes,” “reports of threatened or 
contemplated depredations by enemies of State,” and “names and descriptions of outlaw 
organizations and of persons belonging to bomb gangs.”179 Congress agreed, and legislators began 
studying the feasibility of receiving “crime statistics and other subjects germane to the division under 
the law, all to be afforded enforcing offices as information for the prevention, suppression and 
detection of crime.”180 
In fact, by the 1920s, calls for better and more statistical data on all things crime related were 
heard from a diverse array of constituents, from law enforcement to census wonks, from lawyers to 
social scientists.181 The Wickersham Commission, in its extensive survey of what went wrong with 
the Prohibition experiment, also touted the importance of data, noting “[s]tatistics are needed to tell 
us, or at least to help us tell us, what we have to do now, how we are doing it, and how far what we 
are doing responds to what we have to do.”182 The commissioners deplored that “no such data can 
be had for the country as a whole” and proposed that data collection and analysis should be 
centralized under one federal agency.183  
The Commission was adamant that the Bureau ought not to be selected for the task, lest it 
marshal criminal statistics to justify its expanding authority. “It takes but little experience,” the 
Wickersham Report explained, “to convince that a serious abuse exists in compiling [criminal 
statistics] as a basis for requesting appropriations or for justifying the existence of or urging 
expanded powers and equipment for the agency in question rather than for the purposes which 
criminal statistics are designed to further.”184 By the time the Wickersham Commission issued its 
report in 1931, however, Congress had already selected the Bureau on the recommendation of the 
IACP.185 In 1928, the association had suggested that “the Identification Division of the Department 
of Justice might be a very logical place in which to assemble statistics on crime” because all 
fingerprints were already going to the Bureau.186 It did make sense; the project required the voluntary 
participation of local police, which had the criminal information that would furnish the statistics in 
the first place, and the Bureau had already nurtured collaborative relationships with them. 
In addition to Dyer Act prosecutions and the Identification and Information Division, the 
Bureau’s further fostered its relationship with locals through the FBI Laboratory, which was set up 
in 1932 and provided forensic assistance to departments throughout the country.187 In 1935, the 
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Bureau also established the National Academy to train police officers and, in the process, create a 
cadre of willing collaborators in Bureau operations. During his 1937 appropriations testimony, 
Hoover noted that the Academy “remove[d] the argument for the establishment of a national police 
force” because it “bridge[d] over that gap between local and Federal law-enforcement officers” by 
“eliminat[ing] the jealousies that sometimes exist and help[ing] to do away with friction which may 
develop.”188 By 1940, he would proclaim the Academy the “West Point of Law Enforcement” and 
its graduates a “‘reserve force’ that could ‘be mustered into the service of the FBI.’”189 
To make sure that the American public, and not just the local police, understood the 
Bureau’s role, Hoover allowed Universal Pictures to shoot a short documentary about the FBI, titled 
You Can’t Get Away With It, showcasing the agency’s work.190 Released in 1936, the film explained 
how violations of the Dyer Act “put the G-men” on the trail of notorious criminals. It recorded the 
Identification Division’s cache of fingerprints and system of matching them to suspects, as well as 
the Crime Lab where experts analyzed fingerprints, handwriting, and bullet patterns; created 
moulage impressions to compare teeth marks, footprints, and other body parts; and used 
newfangled scientific tools so that “there was no crime that cannot be solved.” The documentary 
even showed agents practicing their marksmanship at the Academy. You Can’t Get Away With It 
closed with Hoover looking straight into the camera, declaring that the FBI “belongs to you.” The 
film captures both strands of the Bureau’s strategy: an avowal of service, deeply rooted in its 
relationships with state and local authorities, and a barely implicit declaration of its centrality to 
crime-fighting throughout the nation.191 
III. Collaborative Federalism Implications 
The Bureau’s work on Dyer Act cases, its administration of the National Identification and 
Information Division, and its operation of the Crime Lab and the National Academy, not only 
expanded its capacity and authority but also, as Part III.A argues, sustained local police autonomy. 
Significantly, these projects left little space for state governments in the policing realm. Part III.B 
next explores a policy path not taken, which could have given states more programmatic control 
over law enforcement matters. Finally, Part III.C examines the consequences of collaborative 
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federalism, namely, how it impeded the development of state and federal oversight mechanisms of 
local policing, and concludes with a proposal for reform in light of this history. 
A. Sustaining Local Police at the Expense of State Authority 
Tech entrepreneurs today would be familiar with what the Bureau did: it essentially created a 
platform for the exchange of criminal information. As Lina Khan illustrated with Amazon, the firm 
controlling a platform can eventually gain competitive advantage when it also pursues the same sorts 
of business as its platform users.192 But unlike the Amazon story, the Bureau was unlikely to replace 
or take over the locals. Regardless of new criminal statutes or presidential orders that expanded its 
jurisdiction, and despite the Bureau’s efforts to burnish its national status by making Big Cases on 
the backs of locals, its size and structure precluded significant displacement of their authority.193 In 
any case, the Bureau showed no inclination in doing so and instead fostered the autonomy of local 
departments, which came, crucially, at the expense of state authority. 
Legal scholars and historians, however, have overlooked the Bureau’s embrace of localism 
when assessing the federal government’s growing role in law enforcement. Jurisprudential debates 
on whether a formal “anti-commandeering” doctrine mediates the relationship between federal and 
local agencies, and whether the Rehnquist Court created that doctrine out of whole cloth in New 
York v. United States (1992) and Printz v. United States (1997), are merely academic.194 Operational or 
cooperative federalism has guaranteed that principle. Cops don’t work for free, and neither do their 
departments. Throughout the twentieth century, locals were able to negotiate their relationships with 
the feds from a position of informational strength.195 Their monopoly over local knowledge that the 
feds needed to go after high-profile priorities served as much as a guarantee against unwanted 
federal intervention as the political and doctrinal safeguards that have been the subject of much 
scholarly discussion.196 
Historians, meanwhile, have pointed to the Roosevelt administration as a major turning 
point in the federal government’s involvement in the traditionally local sphere of crime and 
punishment.197 Certainly, there were a busy few years. In 1934, Congress passed nine crime bills, 
built Alcatraz prison and, for the first time, authorized Bureau agents to carry guns and make arrests. 
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Moreover, the war on crime enlarged the Bureau’s domain and did result in an increase in 
manpower.198 To further demonstrate the federal government’s attention to the crime problem, 
national lawmakers rechristened the “Division of Investigation” in 1935. It became the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation.199 
But the collaborative relationship that the Bureau had forged with locals remained 
indispensable and was reaffirmed at the 1934 Attorney General’s Conference on Crime, the 
Roosevelt administration’s big event to demonstrate its seriousness about the war on crime. One of 
the main agendas at the conference was to clarify the national government’s role in criminal 
enforcement. According to Attorney General Cummings’s opening remarks, “Just how far the work 
of the federal department should go and just what the form of interrelation between the agencies 
representing the state and federal governments should be, is, of course, one of the crucial questions 
which faces us in this Conference.” 200 One attendee, Earl Warren, then district attorney of Alameda 
City, California, maintained that “there must be an integration of all law enforcement activities” and 
that he wished “to see this done, not by transferring our local police powers to the Federal 
Government nor by shifting the responsibility for maintaining law and order to Washington, D.C. 
but by bringing about a degree of cooperation and coordination of activity.”201 Bureau Director 
Hoover could not agree more. The “best and only kind of a National Police which America will 
tolerate,” he insisted, was “local officers with a knowledge of local conditions and local criminals” 
who performed their duties with “the support of the Federal Government.”202 To be sure, the US 
Attorney for the Southern District of New York called for an end to local autonomy, but his call was 
limited to the prosecuting function. He sought “the creation of genuine state departments of justice” 
with appointed leaders to supersede local, elected prosecutors.203 No one questioned the norm of 
local police autonomy.204 
Neither did those in FDR’s orbit. Columbia law professor Raymond Moley, whom 
Roosevelt tasked with devising a comprehensive criminal justice policy, noted in his 1934 report to 
the president that “it is very important not to permit the citizen or his local government to get the 
idea that the suppression of crime will be entirely assumed by Federal enforcement machinery.”205 
As Moley described the administration’s crime program, the goal was not “that the United States 
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Government should supersede State authorities,” but only “to give Federal authorities the power to 
cooperate with local forces when necessary.”206 In addition, Attorney General Cummings justified 
FDR’s crime bills by focusing on the “twilight zone,” the area in “between the jurisdictions of the 
Federal and State Governments” where “the predatory criminal takes hopeful refuge.”207 Assuring 
those wary of federal overreach, Cummings avowed that the “Federal Government has no desire to 
extend its jurisdiction beyond cases in which, due to the nature of the crime itself, it is impossible 
for the States adequately to protect themselves.”208 
To be sure, the desire to strengthen the role of states also figured prominently in the 
Administration’s program. To underscore its commitment to keep the national government’s role as 
limited as possible, one of its “twelve point plan for crime prevention” included a provision giving 
blanket congressional consent to interstate compacts “for cooperative effort and mutual assistance 
in the prevention of crime and in the enforcement of their respective criminal laws and policies.”209 
This proposal was first introduced in 1932 during the tenure of President Hoover, a staunch localist. 
Introducing the bill, Representative Sumners had pointed out that there was “just one of two things” 
that the federal government could do in response to crimes carried out across state lines: either send 
criminal functions “back to the States” or “reconcile ourselves to be governed by a great Federal 
bureaucracy.”210 He sought to do the former by giving “two sovereign States the privilege of entering 
into any agreement they want to, to protect their citizens against people who ought to be shot on 
sight.”211 A critical part of FDR’s legislative package was thus a measure to contain the federal law 
enforcement apparatus by encouraging coordination among the states.212  
After the passage of the Crime Control Compact Consent Act of 1934, the states got to 
work. In 1935, they established the Interstate Commission on Crime, and delegates to its inaugural 
conference met “to discuss ways and means of overcoming loopholes in the criminal laws [and] in 
our law-enforcement structure”—the “twilight zone” that Cummings had identified.213 They came 
together to draft interstate compacts as well as uniform laws that would standardize the handling of 
cases with a multi-state aspect. The Interstate Commission recommended model legislation on 
extradition, the rendition of witnesses, the supervision of parolees who frequently moved from one 
state to another, and more. Significantly, none of the uniform laws sought to interfere with local law 
enforcement. The closest that the Commission came to stepping on local functions was its 
consideration of crime prevention, where it recognized that most causes of crime stemmed from 
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breakdowns in the family or neighborhood unit and, accordingly, that solutions to the problem 
would be local as well.214 Still, the Commission refrained from getting too involved, and the only role 
it saw for itself, as a body representing the states, was to serve as a “clearing house for the gathering 
and dissemination” of information on successful community programs, such as juvenile courts and 
juvenile training institutions.215 While the Commission also endorsed the creation of “protective 
police” dedicated to “the needs and habits of youth,” it stopped short of recommending any action 
on the part of the states.216 Ultimately, interstate compacts and uniform laws left local police 
agencies alone. 
B. A Policy Path Not Taken 
Even if no one contemplated that states would take over some local responsibilities, it could 
have happened indirectly had the Roosevelt administration’s promotion of interstate compacts come 
with financial grants-in-aid that would have given states more programmatic control over policing.217 
This was a significant road not taken. As Jon Teaford observed, the federal government can 
empower states within a policy space by making them, not localities, the recipients of federal 
funding.218 For example, the Federal-Aid Road Act of 1916 strengthened the control of state 
administrators over local highway construction and maintenance by funneling grants through the 
states.219 Thanks to federal money, by 1940, most states had assumed complete responsibility for 
primary highways and, in some states, for all highway systems.220 And Karen Tani has shown how 
federal aid fostered similar dynamics during the New Deal with respect to welfare policy, another 
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traditionally local matter.221 As Martha Derthick wrote of federal policy for highways and poor relief 
in this period, “Grant-in-aid conditions were above all delocalizing—quite deliberately so.”222  
Yet, the converse played out for criminal law enforcement. No parallel effort materialized to 
erode “the bedrock of localism,” as Derthick put it, even though the federal government could have 
put serious money on the table, for instance, to assist states in facilitating their own extradition 
arrangements.223 Even though the Constitution’s Extradition Clause already provided for the return 
of fugitives from one state to another, it was largely defunct because of the “asylum” state’s oft-
abused discretion in refusing extradition requests, the inefficiencies of extradition processes, and 
lack of funds.224 The Interstate Commission tried to overcome these difficulties with the Uniform 
Extradition Act and even drafted standardized forms that states could use. But the sensitive matter 
of determining which state, the requesting or the receiving one, would pay for transferring arrestees 
continued to hinder interstate coordination.225 
The Roosevelt administration not only failed to materially promote state-coordinated 
extraditions, but it also likely undermined state efforts with the Fugitive Felon Act, another part of 
its 1934 legislative package. The new law provided a substitute for extradition that essentially 
adopted the mechanisms of the Bureau’s informational platform and cut out state actors.226 Under 
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the new regime, the Bureau would use federal charges to obtain jurisdiction over fleeing felons and 
then turn them over to the local authorities seeking them. The Bureau having played its keystone 
role, federal charges would then be dismissed.227 The law was first used against two sisters who fled 
to avoid testifying against their brother in his trial for the murder of one sister’s husband.228 Hoover 
soon touted the Bureau’s ability “to render extensive assistance to local authorities by making 
available its Nation-wide facilities in searches for fugitives” who had committed local offenses.229 
The important takeaway here is that it was the feds, not the states, to whom locals were indebted.  
The Fugitive Felon Act was well received, even by those who otherwise might have been 
opposed to federal intervention. The Interstate Commission’s “Handbook,” which compiled all the 
uniform laws and interstate compacts, also included an essay by the US attorney general’s assistant 
that celebrated the new law, even as the Commission encouraged states to adopt the Uniform 
Extradition Act.230 Southerners also appreciated how the law would allow them to circumvent the 
sensibilities of a rendering jurisdiction, at least when the feds were willing. For instance, it enabled a 
county sheriff in Georgia to obtain custody of an African American who fled to New York to avoid 
being lynched, despite New York Governor Lehman’s refusal to “even entertain” an extradition 
request unless charges against the man were reduced.231 Issues of gubernatorial discretion continued 
to dog the interstate rendition process in later years, but the availability of federal circumvention 
made cooperative resolution among the states unnecessary.232 
In time, federal block grants under the Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965 and the 
Safe Street Acts of 1968 would pour money into both state and local law enforcement efforts, which 
had the potential to expand the criminal justice bureaucracy at the state level.233 But governors have 
generally stayed out of the planning process.234 The separation of centralized “formal law-making 
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agencies”—legislatures and state court systems—from locally controlled “police enforcement 
processes” remained undisturbed.235 As Michael Campbell concluded, “no wholesale rethinking of 
how to organize and coordinate state and local criminal justice systems occurred in most states,” and 
local jurisdictions were left “with ample leeway in determining how to enforce the law.”236 
What explains the failure to promote state authority with federal aid? Perhaps the states’ 
relatively small role was overdetermined. Criminal information is usually gathered locally, which 
tends to pull authority down to the lowest levels even in the most centralized policing regimes.237 In 
addition, Americans’ commitment to localized criminal justice ran deep, and ideological concerns 
about centralized police also applied to state police. According to one study, only five states had 
some form of state police in 1905.238 As a result, state police forces were underdeveloped latecomers 
in the 1930s, when most states finally established them to enforce traffic and highway safety laws 
and not to perform general police functions.239 In the South, unease that governors, likely more 
attentive to the state’s reputation beyond, would unduly intrude on local norms of white supremacy 
only reinforced resistance to state centralization.240 
And while portrayals of J. Edgar Hoover as the indomitable bureaucratic warrior may be 
overstated, he could not have been pleased when commentators heralding interstate compacts 
further envisioned that states might even “establish a joint crime detection laboratory and fingerprint 
bureau, or even a joint police force.”241 Were state authorities to replace the feds as the critical 
interlocutors with local police departments, the Bureau’s standing would indeed have been affected. 
Hoover took this risk quite seriously. According to former assistant director William Sullivan, the 
agency 
maintained a blacklist of police departments euphemistically called the 
‘Restricted List.’ A law enforcement agency placed on the Restricted List 
may find itself completely cut off from the services of the FBI Lab. The 
quickest and surest way for a local department to be placed on the 
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Restricted list was to criticize the efficiency of the FBI or to encourage the 
establishment of independent regional labs.242 
The Bureau continued to cement its position within the national law enforcement system by 
removing potential competition, just as it had once eliminated competing fingerprint registries by 
acquiring the IACP’s and Leavenworth’s databases.243  
For all of these reasons, and perhaps also path dependency, federal criminal legislation 
remained the default solution to interstate coordination problems throughout the twentieth 
century.244 A recent example is the 1992 Child Support Recovery Act, which solved the interstate 
problem of “deadbeat dads” who reside outside the jurisdiction of a state seeking to recover child 
support.245 Unlike auto thefts, child support cases didn’t fill the federal docket, but the nature of the 
response was similar to the Dyer Act and the Fugitive Felon Act. These laws relieved states from 
having to fashion coordination strategies and gave localities the means to surmount jurisdictional 
challenges without any state mediation, all the while building federal capacity. 
C. The Consequences of Collaborative Federalism and Possible Reforms 
Federal criminal laws and resources that fostered collaborative relations with locals came 
with troubling structural consequences that are front and center today. One was the federal 
government’s reluctance to interfere with local law enforcement. Even where the Bureau had the 
legislative authority to act, it often exercised its discretion not to when cases touched on racial 
matters sensitive to local politics.246 When the NAACP appealed to Roosevelt to use the federal 
kidnapping law to prosecute two southern lynchings in which the victims had been transported over 
state lines, Attorney General Cummings advised the president that doing so would be inappropriate 
absent more authority from Congress.247 But Cummings, committed to keeping southern support 
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for the war on crime, also pointedly refused to push for an anti-lynching law, explaining that 
“lynching was a local matter.”248 Similarly, in 1946, when Justice Department officials pushed the 
Bureau to investigate the lynching of four African Americans in Monroe, Georgia, Director Hoover 
balked, citing overload from other cases and the limits of his statutory authority.249 
DOJ and its Bureau were indeed well aware of local pressure points. When, in 1959, the 
Eisenhower Administration tried to extend the Fugitive Felon Act to cover those wanted for school 
and church bombings that were a violent part of the massive resistance to desegregation decrees, 
DOJ officials took pains to reassure legislators that local, not federal, authorities would pursue these 
atrocities. As Attorney General Rogers emphasized, the Bureau would assist, “not supersede local 
law enforcement agencies.”250 For good measure, he also pointed out that of the 947 fugitives that 
the Bureau had located in fiscal year 1957, only nine faced charges in federal court.251 Although the 
1959 effort failed, the Kennedy Administration was able to obtain an even broader extension of the 
Act in 1961. Still, Congress, not content to rely on the executive branch’s assurances, explicitly 
required that fugitives would not be prosecuted federally absent exceptional circumstances.252 This 
limiting provision was unnecessary, for the Bureau’s operational reliance on locals ensured that the 
civil rights probes that it did launch were episodic and exceptional. Ultimately, the Bureau’s 
commitment to local agencies overshadowed any interest in monitoring the police.  
In time, the Bureau, spurred by changing national priorities, would develop more of a civil 
rights agenda and, at least in the most egregious cases, overcome its structural reluctance to 
investigate police violence.253 But because the Bureau’s primary focus has been on crime control and 
only secondarily on constitutional and equitable policing, the federal role in promoting the latter has 
been limited. Certainly, the Bureau has not been the only federal interlocutor with local departments, 
and federal funding programs administered by other agencies might have been used to spur police 
reform. But as Rachel Harmon has noted, “[b]eyond the usual requirements for monitoring 
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spending and complying with federal antidiscrimination law, federal public safety programs do little 
to promote lawfulness, accountability, or fairness in policing.”254 
What little that the federal government did, however, paled in consequence with what the 
states did not do. The Bureau’s direct relationships with police departments and the still paltry 
federal resources put towards constraining local police autonomy undermined state influence and 
undercut any state oversight that might have developed. This history helps explain why, to this day, 
governors and other state-level actors still lack authority over policing, or, if they have it, are slow to 
use it.255 To be sure, states are involved in penal matters like prison construction and 
decriminalization.256 But that involvement has rarely extended directly to criminal enforcement 
operations. While states provide penal laws and prisons, counties and municipalities still manage the 
rest of the criminal justice system, from deciding who gets prosecuted for what, to how criminal 
suspects and defendants are treated, to how police and prosecutors interact with the communities 
they serve.257 Cogent calls for statewide administrative supervision are regularly heard but to little 
avail.258 
As a result, local police practices have largely developed over the decades without any 
significant state or federal oversight, with destructive consequences on communities of color.259 
Take, for instance, the Ferguson Police Department, which preyed on the poorest, most 
disadvantaged members of the community in search of fines, fees, and forfeitures to subsidize 
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municipal coffers.260 Officials in St. Louis defended the patchwork of sixty different police 
departments against proposals to consolidate, claiming that “keeping it local” ensured that each 
community’s needs were heard and addressed.261 But a report by a police reform group observed 
that “some of these departments were the same ones where community policing is neglected in 
favor of revenue generation, and where many residents do not trust the police.”262 The report also 
highlighted the lack of state oversight, noting that Missouri had underfunded and understaffed a 
state program intended to avoid the “muni shuffle,” which refers to the reassignment of problem 
officers to different departments, usually to those “in the poorest, often high-crime communities.”263 
These problems are not limited to Ferguson, as reports of other cities and counties make clear.264 
Many local governments throughout the country have been relying on traffic fines and court fees 
disproportionately exacted on the poor and people of color to fund their police departments. 
Moreover, the problem of the “wandering officer”—substandard, even dangerous, officers bounced 
from department to department—endures.265 
To be sure, the federal government has, at least until the Trump Administration, made some 
efforts to constrain local autonomy, but these have been limited.266 In the mid-1990s after the police 
beating of Rodney King, Congress authorized the Justice Department to pursue institutional change 
in departments with “patterns or practices” of unconstitutional conduct.267 But backsliding remains 
an issue, and the sustainability of court-ordered reforms over the long term is an open question.268 A 
road not taken in the 1930s—federal support for state-based criminal databases—was to some 
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extent taken after 9/11 with intelligence fusion centers established around the country,269 and state 
governments have created their own DNA databases that are not governed by the strict restrictions 
of the CODIS system that the FBI controls.270  But, perversely, local police have pointed to the 
availability of state-provided infrastructure and centralized services to justify their continued 
independence.271 For their part, states have done comparatively little to address racialized and 
unequal policing.  
But that may be changing.272 Although top-down initiatives may not have been as effective as 
activists would like, grassroots political movements may make more of a difference by pushing states 
to assume responsibilities that have long been rejected or unrecognized. Most recently, the 
Minnesota attorney general took over the prosecution of the officers charged with the murder of 
George Floyd, which had set off a worldwide protest, at the behest of the state’s governor, 
legislators, and members of the victim’s family.273 In the wake of that killing, New York and Iowa 
have empowered their attorneys general to investigate police-involved deaths.274 Colorado set limits 
on police use of force and mandated data collection to crack down on wandering officers.275 
Responding to the furor over Ferguson, the Missouri legislature, supported by the governor, 
reduced the cap on general operating revenue that a municipality could collect from traffic tickets, 
from 30 percent to 20 percent, in an effort to rein in abusive local practices.276 Connecticut recently 
barred local police forces from hiring officers dismissed for misconduct by other state agencies, as 
well as those who resigned to avoid dismissal.277 The Trump administration’s withdrawal from the 
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already limited federal oversight has itself spurred some state governments to step up to embrace 
structural reform.278 In California, the state attorney general is now overseeing the reform of the San 
Francisco Police Department and has statutory authority to bring other “pattern or practice” 
cases.279  
Importantly, as the historical account told in this Article suggests, all of these efforts can be 
further aided with federal funding given directly to the states and tied to local compliance with 
minimum policing standards. State governments surely don’t have a monopoly on virtue. But they 
have, or could develop, powerful mechanisms for overcoming local police pathologies and at least 
catalyzing change. 
It remains to be seen whether the states or the federal government under a different 
administration can overcome the discrimination and inequality that will always be the “dark side” of 
local autonomy.280 Left to their own devices, governors and legislators may be reluctant to change 
historical expectations and take on accountability for local policing.281 Indeed, they have often 
declined to do so by caving to anti-reform police union lobbying.282  The political risks can change 
however.283 If recent events offer any indication, local protest movements may be the necessary, 
even if not sufficient, factor in countering the endurance, and pathologies, of localism. This Article 
suggests that reformers may find it far more efficient, and perhaps even more effective, to target 
their efforts at federal and state authorities even as they continue efforts to hold local officials to 
account. As Patrick Joyce and Chandra Mukerji have urged, we should see “the state not as a thing 
but as a shape-shifting assemblage of people and things.”284 Far from being a unitary actor, it is “at 
heart a communication complex and territorial entity, one that keeps reweaving the fabric of 
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government with changing lines of communication and different ways of managing problems of 
distance.” While police forces may be a permanent fixture of law enforcement,285 protestors and 
progressive state governments can reweave the fabric of government by claiming their positions in 
the criminal justice system. 
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